Today’s Religion Law Quiz has a short question, but a very long answer. But I’d encourage you to read the full answer. I personally think it is very educational.
True or False: Strip away the ability of individuals to work together free from governmental oversight and intrusion, and the freedom to associate may become no freedom at all—individuals deterred, groups diminished, and their protected advocacy suppressed.
(Scroll down for the answer)
Answer: True. Here’s what the Supreme Court said earlier this year.
Our cases have held that governments can infringe freedom of association in varied ways. For example, governments might require a group to accept members it does not want, deny benefits to an organization based on its message, or punish individuals for their affiliations. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 174, 181–182, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion). We have also held that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy” can “constitute a[n] effective ... restraint on freedom of association.” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163.
NAACP v. Alabama addressed this last problem “in its starkest form.” AFP, 594 U.S. at 606, 141 S.Ct. 2373. Responding to the NAACP's efforts to promote integration in Alabama in the 1950s, the State's Attorney General (and future Governor) John Patterson brought a lawsuit in state court. In it, he contended that the NAACP was operating illegally in Alabama because it had failed to register with the Secretary of State as required by state law. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 451–453, 78 S.Ct. 1163. As remedy, he sought a judicial decree effectively banning the organization from the State. Id., at 452, 78 S.Ct. 1163. And to prove his allegation that the NAACP was operating in Alabama, Mr. Patterson demanded the names and addresses of all NAACP members and agents in the State. Id., at 453, 78 S.Ct. 1163. When the organization refused to disclose its membership rolls, a state court imposed a sanction of $100,000 (over $1 million today), and the Alabama Supreme Court let the sanction stand. Id., at 453–454, 78 S.Ct. 1163.
This Court reversed that judgment. In doing so, we began by observing the “vital relationship” between “privacy in one's associations” and the “freedom to associate.” Id., at 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163. Strip away the ability of individuals to work together free from governmental oversight and intrusion, and the freedom to associate may become no freedom at all—individuals deterred, groups diminished, and their protected advocacy suppressed. See ibid. Nor, we added, is it “a novel perception” that these outcomes are “particularly” likely to follow when the government seeks to intrude into the workings of groups that hold “dissident beliefs” disfavored by those holding the reins of power. Ibid.
Applying these observations to the case at hand, we held that the Attorney General's demand for the NAACP's private membership rolls burdened the constitutional right of the organization's members “to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate,” given the demand's tendency to “induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it.” Id., at 463, 78 S.Ct. 1163. Because the Attorney General had not identified any interest “sufficient to justify the deterrent effect” associated with his disclosure demand, we continued, it could not be sustained. Id., at 463–466, 78 S.Ct. 1163.
Since NAACP v. Alabama, we have faced many cases along similar lines. In them, one state authority or another has demanded private donor or member information. And in one case after another we have subjected those demands to heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Throughout, we have emphasized the critical role “ ‘privacy in ... associatio[n]’ ” plays “ ‘in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression.’ ” AFP, 594 U.S. at 606–607, 141 S.Ct. 2373. We have acknowledged, too, that demands for private donor information “inevitabl[y]” carry with them a “deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296–297, 81 S.Ct. 1333, 6 L.Ed.2d 301 (1961); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963); Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 91–92, 103 S.Ct. 416, 74 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982).
Our most recent encounter with a demand for donor information came five years ago in AFP. There, California Attorney General Rob Bonta sent “deficiency letters” to the Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More Law Center—the first, a charity “ ‘devoted to education and training about ... constitutionally limited government’ ”; the second, “a public interest law firm whose ‘mission is to protect religious freedom, ... family values, and the sanctity of human life.’ ” 594 U.S. at 602–603, 141 S.Ct. 2373. In his letters, Mr. Bonta sought the names and addresses of anyone who donated more than $5,000 in a single year to either group. Id., at 602, 141 S.Ct. 2373. When the organizations protested that they kept donor information private “[o]ut of concern for their donors’ anonymity,” the Attorney General responded by threatening fines and the suspension of each organization's status as a tax-exempt charity. Id., at 602–603, 141 S.Ct. 2373.
We held that the State's demand, like others before it, violated the First Amendment. To be sure, the Attorney General “trie[d] to downplay” the impact his demand had on associational rights, stressing that he promised to keep the groups’ donor information to himself and prohibit its public dissemination. Id., at 615, 141 S.Ct. 2373. But we found that promise of no moment. Demands for private donor information, we held, “chill” protected First Amendment associational rights even when those demands contemplate disclosure only to government officials and not “ ‘the general public.’ ” Id., at 616, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960)). So any demand for donor information, we said, must overcome heightened First Amendment scrutiny “given the ‘deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights’ that arises as an ‘inevitable result of the government's conduct.’ ” AFP, 594 U.S. at 607, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65, 96 S.Ct. 612). Nor, we ruled, could the Attorney General satisfy heightened First Amendment scrutiny, as his document demand was not sufficiently tailored to serve the government interests that he asserted. 594 U.S. at 611–619, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (majority opinion).
First Choice Women's Res. Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114, 1122–24, 224 L. Ed. 2d 672 (2026) (emphasis added).
Disclaimer: The Religion Law Quizzes are provided as a service to you. They are intended only for educational purposes. Nothing in the Quizzes is intended to be legal advice and they should not be relied upon as conclusive on any issue discussed therein.