United States Central Area

Religion Law Quiz #278

Summary: In a recent U.S. District Court decision, the claims of Ashraf Maniar and Umaima Shaikh, who argued that being on the Terrorist Screening Dataset and Selectee List impeded their religious freedom, were dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that these placements caused significant travel delays and risks during religious pilgrimages, particularly Hajj. However, the court concluded there wasn't sufficient evidence to show substantial travel disruptions or a coercion to change religious practices. The Free Exercise and RFRA claims were considered unsubstantiated as the plaintiffs couldn't demonstrate a significant burden on religious exercise directly related to U.S. government action. The ruling sets a precedent that mere travel inconveniences do not equate to legally recognizable religious liberty violations.
AI Summary

Does continuing including on the Government’s Terrorist Screening Dataset and a placement on a Selectee list violate a person’s religious freedom rights? 

 

(Scroll down for the answer)

 Answer: According to a recent decision from the U.S. D. Ct. of Columbia the answer is “No”.  ASHRAF MANIAR & UMAIMA SHAIKH, Plaintiffs, v. KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Sec'y of the United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., Defendants. Additional Party Names: Brian Driscoll, Melanie Harvey, Michael Glasheen, Pam Bondi, Pete R. Flores, No. CV 19-3826 (EGS), 2026 WL 886997 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2026).

 Here is an A.I. generated summary of the decision:

 

In this memorandum opinion, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government’s motion to dismiss the claims of Ashraf Maniar and Umaima Shaikh, practicing Muslims who alleged that their continuing inclusion in the Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS) and placement on the “Selectee List” burdened their constitutional and statutory rights. As relevant to religious liberty, Plaintiffs argued that watchlisting made it “dangerous, if not impossible” to complete religious pilgrimage obligations—particularly Hajj—because of expected heightened screening, delays, and risk of detention abroad tied to information sharing. The court dismissed the case without prejudice, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege the necessary threshold harms to support Free Exercise or Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) relief.

On the First Amendment Free Exercise claim, the court framed Plaintiffs’ theory as resting on anticipated interference with international travel needed for pilgrimage, rather than a direct prohibition on religious practice. The court emphasized that Plaintiffs’ post–No Fly List allegations showed, at most, limited travel inconvenience: Ms. Shaikh alleged difficulty obtaining a boarding pass and an “SSSS” designation, but not missed flights or significant delays; Mr. Maniar described a single international trip that involved questioning and detention by foreign officials. Because the pleaded facts did not show significant, frequent travel delays—much less an inability to fly—the court held Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the government’s actions put substantial pressure on them to modify religious behavior or violated their ability to perform Hajj. Having found no plausible burden, the court did not reach whether the underlying aviation-security authorities operate as neutral, generally applicable rules, or whether there was disparate impact on Muslim Americans.

The court reached a similar conclusion under RFRA, which provides broader protection than the Free Exercise Clause by requiring the government to justify any action that “substantially burden[s]” religious exercise as the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest. Plaintiffs contended that watchlisting “limits their freedom of movement” and thereby prevents a core religious obligation. But the court held they did not plead facts showing even a meaningful burden on movement attributable to Selectee List status, and therefore could not meet RFRA’s threshold “substantial burden” element. Because the substantial-burden requirement was not satisfied, the court did not proceed to RFRA’s strict-scrutiny steps (compelling interest and least restrictive means), even while recognizing the national-security rationale for keeping Selectee List criteria undisclosed.

Overall, the opinion treats the asserted religious-liberty injuries as derivative of travel burdens, and it draws a line between fear or deterrence from traveling (including fear of foreign detention) and a legally cognizable burden on religious exercise caused by the U.S. government. The dismissal signals that, at least on these pleadings, allegations of stigma, anxiety, or occasional friction in air travel are insufficient to state Free Exercise or RFRA claims; instead, Plaintiffs would need well-pleaded facts showing a concrete, substantial interference with their ability to travel for pilgrimage (for example, a consistent pattern of significant delays, missed flights, or effective inability to fly attributable to watchlisting), and a clearer causal connection to U.S. government action rather than independent decisions by foreign authorities.

 

Disclaimer: The Religion Law Quizzes are provided as a service to you. They are intended only for educational purposes. Nothing in the Quizzes is intended to be legal advice and they should not be relied upon as conclusive on any issue discussed therein.

 

1 comment

Wonderful. Thank you!